



Secure Information Exchange in Vehicular and Power Grid Networks



Donghoon Shin, Jinkyoo Koo, Madalina Baker, and Prof. Saurabh Bagchi


Contact: Prof. Saurabh Bagchi (sbagchi@purdue.edu; 765-494-3362)

Dependable Computing System Lab (DCSL), School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Purdue University

Introduction

- Over the past years, ad hoc wireless networks (AWNs) have received great attention as a promising technology for a variety of applications.
- However, it is a difficult task to keep the communications secure when the AWNs are under the attack. The nodes are inherently vulnerable to attacks because they are usually deployed in non-protected environments. → Security issues
- In addition, once nodes are deployed, it is a challenging task to send and receive timely updates: Nodes are typically located in hard-to-reach places and state update or dissemination consumes significant energy. → Reprogramming issues

DCSL answers the questions below!



Optimal Monitoring in Multi-Channel Wireless Networks

- Deploy a set of monitoring nodes being trusted to monitor the behaviors of other nodes in multi-channel AWNs
- Optimal placement and channel selection of monitoring nodes

Where to place a given number of monitoring nodes among several possible locations in the network and which channels to tune their radios to, in order to maximize the detection coverage?

Equivalently

Given a set of monitoring nodes deployed in the network, how to select a subset of monitoring nodes to be activated and channels for the selected monitoring nodes, in order to maximize the detection coverage?

Greedy Algorithm


- At each iteration, pick the pair of monitoring node not yet selected and channel that gives maximum coverage improvement
- Repeat above process until a given number of monitoring nodes is chosen or all sensor nodes are covered

Basic steps of LP rounding algorithms

- Formulate a given optimization problem into an integer linear program (ILP)
- Transform the ILP to an LP by relaxing the integer constraints
- Solve the LP relaxation (using one of many existing LP solvers)
- Round the optimal solution of LP relaxation

- We develop two different rounding schemes


- Probabilistic Rounding Scheme (PRS)
- Deterministic Rounding Scheme (DRS)



Worst Performance Guarantees of Proposed Algorithms


Efficient Code Dissemination

Steady State Maintenance



- Any multi-hop wireless network has to be kept up-to-date as new code or new state is generated at the base node.
 - In this work we use code dissemination as a specific example of state dissemination
- Why is there a cost in the steady state?
 - Dynamic network topology: Caused by transient link failures, node mobility, incremental node deployment, etc.
 - Nodes may remain disconnected from the network for some time and may miss the state update
 - After they come out of disconnection, they must detect the inconsistency
- Communication between inconsistent nodes is a problem
 - Incorrect data may be propagated through the network
 - Network may become partitioned
- Existing solution:
 - Each node periodically broadcasts advertisements containing metadata, e.g. code version number
 - Steady state energy cost increases linearly with the steady state period – the most dominant phase in a node's lifetime
 - Radio transmissions are the most energy expensive operation

Varuna Design




- UA msg received from a new neighbor
- Similar Adv msg received from degg or no Adv Msg is received for 'thisop'
- ReToDisseminate msg received or broadcast
- Code update complete
- No Adv Msg received for 'ts_thisop'

Varuna achieves fixed steady state cost

- After a node downloads a new version of the code, it verifies its metadata with each of its neighbor *only once*
- Steady state energy cost is independent of the steady state period, subject to sufficient memory and reasonable link reliability
- What is a new neighbor? It does not exist in the Neighbor Table, which is cleared when the node boots or its metadata changes
- When neighbor table is full, LRU replacement is used
- Varuna's invariant: If a node receives a packet from another node with a lower version of the metadata than its own, the metadata inconsistency is detected by the receiving node


Testbed Results: Steady State Energy Cost



Secure Event Collection


- Problem definition: Collection of a delay-sensitive event, e.g., power line instability, in multi-hop wireless networks, in the presence of attacks.
- Base station needs to check every sensor every P unit time.
- Needs a multi-hop routing to check the node at the distance more than one hop from the base station
- ISSUE: Malignant nodes in the middle of the multi-hop route may drop/delay/modify a critical event report.

Straw-man Solution



- Base station checks each line independently, by using ODSBR.
- Any node who has an event to report can put the event log in an ACK packet to the ODSBR.
- If malicious nodes want to stay undetected, they cannot drop/delay/modify the ACK packet.
- Problem:
 - The ACK mechanism of ODSBR is expensive, due to onion signaturing.
 - This expensive ACK scheme should be used all the times, even if there is nothing to report.

Proposed Solution



- Base station keeps circulating a probe token (PT) through each circle.
- On receiving the PT, nodes start its ODSBR timer, expecting to receive an ACK before the timer expires.
- Any node who has an event to report can put the event in the PT with its signature on it.
- High-level ideas:
 - If malicious nodes do not drop the PT, or do not delay the PT for long, the PT returns to the base station within some time. → What is the threshold?
 - In this case, the base station does not need to send ACK packet. Instead, the base station circulates a new PT.
 - This new PT can acknowledge the previous PT before ODSBR timer set up in the previous round expires, if nodes' ODSBR timeout is long enough. → How long?
- Achieved objective:
 - Provides the same security guarantee as ODSBR, but uses the expensive ACK mechanism only when network is under attack.